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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL:
SUPREME COURT DEATH ROW PETITIONERS
Thirty-two states provide for the penalty of death for persons convicted of
homicide. 1 In the face of several Supreme Court decisions which have declared
certain types of death penalty statutes unconstitutional, these states have been
quick to respond by re-enacting capital punishment legislation in order to
conform to the high court's guidelines.
Within two years of the Supreme Court's 1976 decisions invalidating
mandatory death penalty statutes,2 nineteen state legislatures passed new statutes
to keep the death penalty constitutionally alive in their jurisdictions. 3 This
same type of response is expected in states whose statutes would be considered
unconstitutional in light of the Court's recent decisions invalidating the Ohio
death penalty statute.4 These cases, decided in July of 1978, held that death
penalty statutes which do not allow the sentencing judge to consider all
mitigating factors violate the eighth and fourteenth amendments.
Each year, there is a substantial growth in the population of death row
inmates. The present population on death row throughout the country is
487, 5 one hundred more than a year ago.6 Since this population keeps rising,
it is becoming harder to find counsel who will voluntarily assist the prisoners
to prepare their Supreme Court petitions. Once legally mandated representation
by an appointed attorney expires, many of the attorneys "bail out," leaving
the petitioner and his family in the precarious position of having to prepare
a complex petition for a writ of certiorari without funds or the aid of
counsel. 7 Under the Supreme Court Rules, 8 the petition must be filed within
ninety days from the entry of the lower court judgment or else it will be
deemed out of time. The petitioner's problems are multiplied if he must also
file a motion for stay of his execution pending disposition of his certiorari
1. Ala. Code § 13-11-1 et seq. (1975); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 88 13-453, 13-454. (Supp. 1977); Ark.
Stat. Ann. § 41-1301 et seq. (1977); Cal. Penal Code Ann. 8 190 et seq. (Supp. 1978); Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 16-11-402 et seq. (Supp. 1976); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-54b (1977); Del. Code Ann.
tit. 11 § 4209 (Supp. 1977); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141 (Supp. 1978); Ga. Code Ann. § 27-2534.1
(Supp. 1978); Idaho Code §§ 18-4004, 19-2515 (Supp. 1977); Ii. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 9-1 (Smith
Hurd Supp. 1978); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 35-50-2-3, 35-50-2-9 (Burns Supp. 1977); Ky. Rev. Stat. §§
507.020, 532.025 to .075 (Supp. 1977); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 905 et seq. (West Supp.
1978); 1978 Md. Laws, Part 1, ch. 3; Miss. Code Ann. §§ 97-3-21, 99-19-101 et seq. (Supp. 1977);
Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 565.001, 565.006-16 (Vernon Supp. 1978); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 94-5-105
(Supp. 1974); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-2519 et seq. (Supp. 1974); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.030(4)(a),
200.033 et seq. (1977); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 630.1 et seq. (1977); N.Y. Penal Law §§ 60.06,
125.27 (c) (a) (iii) (Supp. 1977); 19 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 406; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, §§ 701.9et
seq. (Supp. 1978); R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-2 (Supp. 1977); S.C. Code § 16-3-20-28 (Supp. 1977);
Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-2402 et seq. (Supp. 1977); Texas Crim. Pro. Code Ann. tit. 37.071 (Vernon
1978); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-206 et seq. (1977); Va. Code § 19.2-264.2 et seq. (Supp. 1977);
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A32.045 (Supp. 1977); 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 122.
2. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
3. Legal Defense Fund, Death Row USA at 2 (June 20, 1978).
4. Lockett v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct. 2954 (1978); Bell v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct. 2977 (1978).
5. Legal Defense Fund, supra note 3, at 1.
6. Legal Defense Fund Amicus Curiae Memorandum for Motion for Appointment of Counsel at 5,
Hughes v. Texas, 46 U.S.L.W. 3765 (1978).
7. Team Defense Project Amicus Curiae Memorandum for Motion for Appointment of Counsel at 3, 4,
Hughes v. Texas, 46 U.S.L.W. 3765 (1978); Legal Defense Fund Amicus Curiae Memorandum,
supra note 6, at 7.
8. Sup. Ct. Rule 22(1) (1970). While the Court Rules pertaining to the time for filing are jurisdictional
(See Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 418 n.7 (1959)), untimely filing can be grounds for
refusal to entertain the petition.
The Right to Counsel
petition.9 Aside from trying to obtain a discretionary appointment of counsel
from the state court, an abandoned petitioner has two choices: to prepare and
file- his petition pro se or to seek out the voluntary services of an attorney.
If the petitioner decides to prepare the petition himself, he is confronted
not only with the ninety-day time limitation, 10 but also with the task of
comprehending complex legal issues which had previously been handled by his
attorney. According to Justice Brennan, "the applicant's most difficult task is
to pursuade at least four of us11 that his case qualifies for and warrants
review . . . [blut those votes are hard to come by - only the exceptional state
case raises a significant federal question demand[ing] review." 12
Other justices and scholars have repeated that in the highly specialized
work of preparing a certiorari petition, the unskilled layman is at a distinct
disadvantage if he must file his petition without the assistance of an attor-
ney. 13 The sophisticated art of preparing a certiorari petition has been considered
such a specialty in the field of law that there has been a debate in legal
circles of whether the petitioner's trial attorney is qualified enough to prepare
the petition or whether he should turn the case over to an appellate
specialist. 14
Many of the pro se petitions which the Clerk's Office of the Supreme
Court receives are mere ramblings of alleged violations of vague and unspecified
constitutional rights which fail to clarify the key legal issues which would
move the Court to grant certiorari. 15 Three out of five pro se pleadings are
returned for failure to comply to any extent to the Court Rules. 16 Thus, in a
practical sense, the pro se petitioner is at a considerable disadvantage in
comparison to the litigant who can afford the professional skills of an attorney.
The second option open to the abandoned litigant is to secure the voluntary
services of an attorney. One organization which attempts to locate counsel for
death row petitioners who are victims of "bail-outs" is the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund. The Fund has been finding it increasingly difficult to loeate
volunteers to represent these inmates before the Supreme Court. 17 The Team
Defense Project, an organization established to help represent death row inmates
in Georgia, has also shown that it is becoming increasingly difficult to obtain
attorneys to represent death row inmates because the "market of attorneys
9. Some state courts refuse to grant such stays of execution pending disposition of a certiorari petition(e.g., Texas and Florida).
10. The ninety-day rule for filing may be extended up to a maximum of sixty days under Supreme Court
Rule 22(l). But this also requires time and effort to prepare such a motion and to convince a Justice
to grant the extension.
11. It requires the vote of four justices in order for the Court to grant a petition for a writ of certiorari.
12. Brennan, J., State Court Decisions and the Supreme Court, 31 Pa. Bar Assoc. Q. 393, 400 (1960).
13. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938); Douglas, J., Right to Counsel: A Forward, 45 Minn.
L. Rev. 693 (1961); Stewart, J., The Indigent Defendant and the Supreme Court of the United
States, 58 Legal Aid Rev. 3, 4 (1960); Boskey, Right to Counsel in Appellate Proceedings, 45 Minn.
L. Rev. 783, 789 (1961); Zeigler & Hermann, The Invisible Litigant: An Inside View of Pro Se
Actions in Federal Courts, 47 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 159 (1972); Note, Indigent Criminals and the Supreme
Court, 27 Rutgers L. Rev. 937 (1974).
14. Carrington, Meador & Rosenberg, Justice on Appeal 83-5 (1976).
15. See, e.g., Stewart, J., The Indigent Defendant and the Supreme Court of the United States, 58 Legal
Aid Rev. 3, 60 (1960); Lewis, The Supreme Court and How It Works: The Story of the Gideon
Case 4-10 (1966); Stern & Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 372-73 (1969); Note, Indigent
Criminals and the Supreme Court, 27 Rutgers L. Rev. 937 (1974).
16. Letter from Edward C. Schade of the Clerk's Office, United States Supreme Court, to author (Aug.
29, 1978) (on file with the Journal of Legislation).
17. Letter from Joel Berger of the Legal Defense Fund to author (Aug. 4, 1978) (on file with the
Journal of Legislation).
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who might act for death row. clients is, in 1978, saturated. s18 The Team
Defense Project indicates that a very small percentage of lawyers do any
criminal work and these lawyers already have all the pro bono work they can
handle. 19 Although these organizations have indicated how serious the present
problem is of obtaining counsel to represent capital inmates, the current growth
rate of the population on death row will only exacerbate the problem of finding
a volunteer attorney to the point of hopelessness.
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL:
THE HISTORY OF THE INDIGENT'S RIGHT IN COURT
The Growth of Constitutional Protection: Pre Ross v. Moffitt
In 1938, the Supreme Court clarified that indigent criminals in federal
trial courts were guaranteed the right to counsel under the sixth amend-
ment.20 The constitutional right to counsel in state trial courts, however, has
had a slow development until the recognition [in Gideon v. Wainright21] that
the sixth amendment right applied to the states. Prior to Gideon, the
constitutional right to counsel in state courts had been found only when there
was a violation of due process as a result of an indigent having been deprived
of counsel. Powell v. Alabama 22 was the first case to recognize that it was
the duty of the state court to assign counsel for the trial of a defendant who
is accused of a capital crime and "is unable to make his own defense because
of ignorance, feeblemindedness, illiteracy or the like."' 23 After Powell, a test
was developed in Betts v. Brady24 to determine whether due process was denied
if, in a trial for a noncapital crime, a defendant was deprived of the assistance
of counsel. This test of whether "it is offensive to common and fundamental
ideas of fairness and right" 25 was the determining factor in noncapital cases
before Betts was overruled by Gideon. 26
On the same day the Court held that Clarence Gideon should be guaranteed
the right to counsel at his state trial, the Court approached the question of
whether the indigent criminal has the right to an attorney on his first appeal
of right. The Court found that this right to counsel existed under the Constitution
in Douglas v. California by reasoning that "there can be no equal justice
where the kind of appeal a man has depends upon the amount of money he
has."' 27 In Douglas, the Court reserved the question of whether one had the
right to an attorney in a discretionary appeal. Later in the 1962 October
Term, the Court turned down seven motions for appointment of counsel
to prepare petitions for certiorari by indigents seeking to have their cases re-
18. Team Defense Project Amicus Curiae Memorandum, supra note 7, at 2.
19. Id. at 2-3.
20. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
21. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
22. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
23. Id. at 71. Two other capital cases decided before Gideon recognized the right to counsel at trial:
Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485 (1945); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945).
24. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
25. Id. at 473.
26. It is not insignificant that many states, independent of the United States Constitution, provided counsel
for indigent defendants in varying degrees in 1942. The scope of this note forbids a detailed analysis.
27. 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963).
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viewed. 28 Immediately after these denials, the prospect of extending the sixth
amendment to include the right to counsel on discretionary appeal dimmed
when there was an instruction to the Clerk of the Supreme Court to advise
litigants that the Court would not appoint counsel to assist indigents in the
preparation of their certiorari petitions. 29
Ross v. Moffitt: The Limit of the Constitutional Right
After the decision in Douglas, four U.S. Courts of Appeals rendered
conflicting judgments on whether the Constitution required that an indigent
defendant has the right to counsel on discretionary appeals. 30 The Seventhand
Tenth Circuits found no authority upon which to base such a right and
therefore denied assistance of counsel. 31 Two later decisions in 1973 by the
Fourth and Sixth Circuits broke new ground to find that the due process and
equal protection clauses protect the indigent's right to counsel on discretionary
review. 32 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that there was no logical basis for any
differentiation between appeals of right and those of permissive review and
found, furthermore, that since legal resources have grown, so has the court's
ability to implement basic notions of fairness. 33 In more sweeping rhetoric, the
Sixth Circuit extolled, "[tlhe temple of criminal justice does not have three
stories for the affluent and only two for the indigent."'34
It was the Fourth Circuit's judgment which the Supreme Court granted
review on certiorari. Claude F. Moffitt had been convicted of forgery in two
separate counties of North Carolina. In one conviction, the North Carolina
courts refused to appoint counsel to prepare a petition for a writ of certiorari
to the state supreme court. On appeal from the other conviction, he was denied
a similar request by the state to prepare a petition to the United States
Supreme Court. The Fourth Circuit reversed the North Carolina courts on
both requests.
In an opinion written by Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court rejected
the argument that either the due process or the equal protection clauses of
the Constitution require a state to provide an attorney for an indigent defendant
on a discretionary appeal.35
Since the right to review a conviction in the U.S. Supreme Court is granted
by Congress, wrote Justice Rehnquist, a state should not be required to appoint
counsel for a review which exists without the consent of the state whose
judgment is sought to be reviewed. 36 Three dissenting Justices agreed with the
Fourth Circuit's opinion and found only a minor burden on the state to provide
such assistance of counsel. 37
28, Drumm v. California, 373 U.S. 947 (1963); Mooney v. New York 373 U.S. 947 (1963); Womack v.
Oregon, 373 U.S. 947 (1963); In re Jacobs, 373 U.S. 947 (1963); In re Diaz, 373 U.S. 947 (1963);
In re Turner, 373 U.S. 947 (1963); Oppenheimer v. California, 374 U.S. 819 (1963).
29, 1962 Supreme Court Journal iv.
30. One Court of Appeals had approached the question prior to Douglas and held that it was not a
violation to refuse counsel to a death row indigent during post-appellate and federal court proceedings.
United States v. Denno, 313 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1963).
31, Peters v. Cox, 341 F.2d 575 (10th Cir. 1965); United States v. Pate, 409 F.2d 757 (7th Cir. 1969)..
32. Moffitt v. Ross, 483 F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1973) rev'd 417 U.S. 600 (1974); Mitchell v. Johnson, 488
F.2d 349 (6th Cir. 1973).
33. Moffit v. Ross, 483 F.2d 650, 653, 655 (4th Cir. 1973), rev'd 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
34. Mitchell v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 349, 353 (6th Cir. 1973).
35. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
36. Id. at 617.
37. Id. at 619-621 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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It is important to note that the Ross appeal was from a conviction of
forgery and not a capital crime. One of the first questions from the bench
during oral argument clarified that North Carolina indigents under the sentence
of death or life imprisonment had the right to direct appeal to the state
supreme court and therefore had the right to counsel in the entire North
Carolina court system. 38 The opinion of the Court also noted this distinc-
tion. 39 Indeed, one district court in 1975 has distinguished the application of
Ross in capital cases.40
Even though the Ross decision has been widely criticized, 41 the Court has
not indicated that there will be any change in its holding or that it will make
any exception in capital cases. The Court has denied, without comment, the
only two motions for appointment of counsel in such cases since Ross. 42 The
second of these motions had been filed by a death row inmate to which the
respondent had no serious objection to the use of the Court's power to appoint
counsel. 43
Statutory Provisions and Policies
Even though the right to counsel on discretionary review did not warrant
constitutional protection, it remains an issue of great importance. Since the
Supreme Court vows only to enforce the constitutional minimum, it leaves the
legislatures to protect other rights which the Constitution does not ensure.44
Following this policy, the concluding paragraph of Justice Rehnquist's Ross opinion
suggests that the states develop policies to provide counsel at stages in the
appellate process when it is not required by the Constitution.45
The only legislature which has enacted laws to grant an indigent criminal
the right to an attorney on discretionary appeal has been Congress. The
Criminal Justice Act of 1964 provides that all indigent defendants accused of
a felony or misdemeanor are to be given the assistance of counsel in federal
courts at every stage of the proceedings through appeal.46 This statute has
been interpreted to include the preparation of petitions for writs of certiorari
for review by the Supreme Court. 47 Since the apparatus for appointment of
counsel under this act is placed into operation by the U.S. District Courts,
this law has never been held to apply to indigents appealing to the Supreme
Court from state judgments.
Presently, in the states which have capital punishment, not one legislature
has enacted laws which would explicitly provide for the assistance of counsel
to prepare certiorari petitions to review cases before the Supreme Court of
the United States. Many states, by court decision or by statute, only abide
38. Oral Arguments, Vol. 13, 73-786 at 5, Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
39. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 613 (1974).
40. Carey v. Garrison, 403 F. Supp. 395 (W.D.N.C. 1975).
41. Note, No Requirement to Provide Counsel for Indigents on Discretionary Appeals, 29 Minn. L. Rev.
153 (1974); Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel on Discretionary Appeals, 28 Sw. L.J. 1051 (1974);
Note, Criminal Procedure - No Right to Counsel on Discretionary Appeal, 53 N.C. L. Rev. 560
(1975).
42. Ray v. Rose, 429 U.S. 809 (1976); Hughes v. Texas, 46 U.S.L.W. 3765 (1978).
43. Respondent's Memorandum to Motion for Appointment of Counsel at 2-3, Hughes v. Texas, 46
U.S.L.W. 3765 (1978).
44. As to the Supreme Court's enforcement of the minimum requirements of the Constitution, see Stewart,
J., The Indigent Defendant and the Supreme Court of the United States, 58 Legal Aid Rev. 3, 4
(1960).
45. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 618 (1974).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(c) (1976).
47. Doherty v. United States, 404 U.S. 28 (1971).
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by the constitutional minimum mandated by Douglas: the right to counsel
only on the first appeal of right.48 One state, Tennessee, has even rescinded
legislation which provided for counsel to assist a pauper petitioning to the
Supreme Court once it was instructed that the Constitution did not mandate
such legislation. 49
The California Supreme Court recognized the need to provide the right
to counsel for a special category of defendants to prepare their certiorari
petitions. In order to "protect the interests of the defendant and promote the
interests of justice," this court appoints counsel to represent indigent defendants
in capital cases on review to the Supreme Court of the United States. 50 The
California court is the only court in the nation to recognize this right.
THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST NEW LEGISLATION: A REBUTTAL
The reasons for opposing new legislation providing counsel for death row
indigents petitioning the Supreme Court have failed to justify the deprivation
of the inmates' right. The denial of assistance of counsel in any criminal
proceeding is a grave consequence, since, in the words of former Chief Justice
Warren, when "a society acts to deprive one of its members of his life, liberty
or property, it takes its most awesome steps." 51 A society which has either
enacted laws by which persons can be prosecuted and by which that conviction
can be reviewed should also provide that these persons' rights are protected
against the skill of the states' attorneys.
The major argument against the passage of a law to provide the Supreme
Court petitioner with counsel is the added public expense to pay for the
attorney. The expense to the public would not be great if laws were passed
to provide for counsel only for death row inmates since the number of these
petitioners is only a tiny fraction of the in forma pauperis petitions filed each
year. In the October Term of 1977, there were only fifty-three capital cases
of the total 2015 pauper cases on the Court's docket. 52 If the same attorney
who had filed the petitioner's first appeal prepared his petition, the time which
the attorney would have to expend in preparing the new document would be
minimal since, at that point, he would be throughly familiar with the issues
of the case. Another factor mitigating the public expense of providing appointed
counsel to the indigent litigants is the reduction of time which government
paid law clerks and other members of the Supreme Court staff would have
to spend to sort through the rambling petitions of many pro se filings and to
48. See, e.g., Alabama: Martin v. State, 277 Ala. 153, 167 So. 2d 912 (1964); Arkansas: Ark. Rules of
Crim. Pro. 8.2(b) (1977); Florida: Cox v. State, 320 So. 2d 449 (1975); Louisiana: State v. Graves,
246 La. 460, 165 So. 2d 285 (1964), see also, La. Code Crim. Pro. Ann art. 516 (West 1967);
Montana: Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 95-1003 (1969); Ohio: Ohio Rules of Crim. Pro. 44(a) (1976);
Oklahoma: Jewel v. Tulsa County, 450 P.2d 833 (1969); South Carolina: Defense of Indigents Act,
Rule 5 (1976); Texas: Ex parte Perez, 479 S.W.2d 283 (1972), see also, Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.
art. 26.04 (comment) (Vernon 1966).
49. This interesting development in Tennessee resulted from the following chronology of Statutes and court
decisions: 1965 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 217, § 5; Hutchins v. State, 504 S.W.2d 758 (Tenn. 1974); State
v. Williams, 529 S.W.2d 714 (Tenn. 1975); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40 - 2018 (Supp. 1977).
50. In re Anderson, 69 Cal. 2d 613, 447 P.2d 117, 73 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1968), ceri. denied, 406 U.S. 971
(1968).
51. Coppedge v. United States, 396 U.S. 438, 449 (1962).
52. Letter from Edward C. Schade, supra note 16.
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present the issues in a coherent format. 53 The fears that there would be an
onslaught of frivolous petitions are lessened by the fact that issues in capital
cases are less likely to be frivolous in view of the nature of the crime and
the punishment sought to be reviewed.
Another argument against providing pro se indigents the right to counsel
on review by the Supreme Court is that the petitioner can always seek a
remedy in a habeas corpus proceeding. This argument does not recognize that
prisoners are not constitutionally guaranteed counsel in their habeas corpus
actions. 54 Furthermore, in habeas corpus proceedings where the defendant has
raised fourth amendment violations and has received no relief from the state
courts, the certiorari petition to the Supreme Court is the only relief in a
federal court by which he can have the state decision reviewed. 55 The
additional time and public expense of a new habeas corpus action is not a
feasible alternative to providing a litigant a meaningful review of his initial
conviction.
The artificial line between appeals of right and discretionary appeals which
the Supreme Court made in Ross is a convenient limit to measure how far
the minimal constitutional protection extends. This line should not prevent
legislatures from providing counsel in discretionary appeals. Since the Supreme
Court is still the ultimate arbiter of a citizen's rights, counsel should be
provided at this critical phase of a defendant's cause. As previously noted,
Judge Haynesworth of the Fourth Circuit found no logical basis for providing
counsel in appeals of right and denying counsel in discretionary appeals. He
noted further that, in some cases, it is in discretionary appeals that a case
receives its most meaningful review. 56
A final argument against providing the right to counsel to death row
petitioners is that, as a practical matter, these inmates have been fortunate
enough to find voluntary counsel to assist them in the past. As the increase
in death row populations continues, however, the number of attorneys who are
available to take pro bono cases reaches the saturation point, the prospects
for voluntary assistance in the future appears bleak. The petitioner who
frantically tries to find an attorney to help present his claims within the ninety-
day time period takes no solace in the fact that others have been fortunate.
When a society provides for a review of its judgment to take the life of one
of its citizens, the preparation of the petition to review should not involve a
chaotic search for assistance but rather a sober process in which counsel is
secured and the issues properfy presented.
CONGRESSIONAL OR STATE RESPONSIBILITY?
There has been much support from the jurists and legal writers for the
idea that indigents should be provided with the assistance of counsel in all
53. This position was advanced by Thomas Anderson, Jr., counsel for Clarence Moffitt, during oral
argument. Oral Arguments, supra note 38, at 37.
54. Vandenades v. United States, 523 F.2d 1220 (5th Cir. 1975); Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F.2d 857 (D.C.
Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 890 (1945); Shum v. Fogliana, 82 Nev. 156, 413 P.2d 495 (1966);
Sykes v. Warden of Maryland Penitentiary, 201 Md. 662, 93 A.2d 549 (1953). The Criminal Justice
Act provides for appointment of counsel in habeus corpus actions upon the discretion of the judge.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3001A(g) (1976).
55. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
56. Moffitt v. Ross, 483 F.2d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
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proceedings of appeal from the original conviction. 57 Additional recom-
mendations for the implementation of this protection of a pauper's right have
been put forth by the American Bar Association and the National Commission
on Criminal Justice.5 8 Some states have already recognized the "awesome step"
of taking the life of one of its citizens and have special provisions for the
qualifications and number of appointed attorneys who represent such persons
accused of a capital crime. 59 When these inmates have exhausted the state
court remedies, their right to counsel vanishes since both Congress and the
states shirk the responsiblility for ensuring fair review on a writ of certiorari.
To justify their neglect of the death row inmate, the states could argue that
they should not have to provide counsel for a review of a state conviction in
a federal court. Congress, on the other hand, could argue that the federal
government did not initiate the prosecution and should, therefore, not have to
protect the inmate's right. There are, however, reasons for both Congress and
the states to take action to provide for this right of representation.
The federal government has a responsibility to provide counsel for indigent
Supreme Court petitioners since the origin of the right to seek review by
certiorari stems from federal law.60 Since Congress has provided for this right,
it should make the review meaningful by providing for the assistance of counsel
in the Court. If Congress was to fulfill the proposed purpose of the Criminal
Justice Act of 1964, it should have provided counsel for all indigent petitioners
to the Supreme Court. The Congressional purpose was to "[p]rovide legal
assistance for indigent defendants in criminal cases in the courts of the United
States."'61 The absence of a provision for appointment of counsel for an indigent
seeking to have a state judgment reviewed by the Supreme Court is a serious
oversight in the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act. Even if Congress does
not want to provide counsel for all indigents appealing from the judgment of
the state court of last resort, it should at least provide counsel for death row
petitioners.
The state legislatures also have an obligation to enact legislation to provide
counsel for Supreme Court petitioners sentenced to death under their laws
since it is the state which exercises the power to deprive the person of his
life.62 The California Supreme Court's appointment of counsel recognizes this
fundamental obligation of the state to provide counsel for such indigents "in
the interest-of justice."'63 More states should follow California's lead and
eliminate the frantic search for counsel so that its citizens can argue their
federal rights in a meaningful petition before the Supreme Court.
57. Douglas, J., Right to Counsel: A Forward, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 693 (1961); Stewart, J., The Indigent
Defendant and the Supreme Court of the United States, 58 Legal Aid Rev. 3, 4 (1960); Moffit v.
Ross, 483 F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1973), rev'd 417 U.S. 600 (1974); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616
(1974); Mitchell v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 349 (6th Cir. 1973); Boskey, Right to Counsel in Appellate
Proceedings, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 783 (1961).
58. ABA Standards on the Administration of Criminal Justice, No. 3.2 at 439 (1974); ABA Standards
Relating to Defense Services, No. 5.2 at 46 (1968 Approved Draft); National Advisory Commission
on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals: Report on the Courts, No. 13.1 at 283 (1973).
59. See, e.g., Ill. Sup. Ct. Rule 607(a) (1976); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-15-17 (Supp. 1977); Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 171.151 (1977)(appointment of two counsel on appeal in capital cases); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit.
22 § 835 (West 1951)(three counsel for capital defendants); La. Code Crim. Pro. Ann. art. 512 (West
1978)(attorney of at least five years experience to be appointed in capital cases); S.C. Code § 16-3-26
(Supp. 1977)(capital defendant is appointed two counsel, one with at least five years experience).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1976).
61. H.R. Rep. No. 804, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 11964] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2990.
62. Carey v. Garrison, 403 F. Supp. 395 (W.D.N.C. 1975), supports this reasoning.
63. In re Anderson, 69 Cal. 2d 613, 447 P.2d 117, 73 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1968), cert. denied. 406 U.S. 971
(1968).
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Whether it is Congress or the states which pass this needed legislation, it
is recommended that, whenever practical, the attorney appointed to prepare
the certiorari petition should be the same attorney who represented the indigent
in the lower courts. By appointing the same counsel, time and public expense
would be saved since the appointment of a new attorney would require him
to familiarize himself with the entire record before drawing up the certiorari
petition. If state legislatures provide for the right to counsel, the procedure
through which an attorney is appointed can be exercised through the apparatus
which the state uses to appoint counsel in the lower courts. If Congress
amended the Criminal Justice Act to provide indigents with counsel for
appealing state judgments to the Supreme Court, the procedure for appointment
could be arranged (1) by federal cooperation with the state court which
appoints counsel or (2) by the Supreme Court appointing counsel upon the
indigent's request.
CONCLUSION
The absence of the right to counsel for an indigent's review of a state
court judgment by the Supreme Court is an unfortunate gap in our criminal
justice system. Several factors show the need for legislative action at this time.
The growing number of death row petitioners coupled with the decreasing
number of volunteer criminal attorneys create realistic doubts as to whether
death row inmates will be adequately represented in the future. The Supreme
Court's refusal to find that the right to counsel attaches on a discretionary
review coupled with the acknowledgement by several justices that appointment
of counsel would greatly help the Court and the petitioner leaves the obligation
to the legislature to provide the right to counsel for such petitioners. Since
the cost of providing counsel for only death row petitioners would not have
a substantial effect on public expenses, the interests of justice demand legislative
action. When a society plans to take the life of one of its members, it should
not take away legal counsel once the issues of the case reach the threshold
of the nation's highest court.
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